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Abstract
This treatise will fully embrace the interdisciplinary approach and will attempt to
apply theoretical physics to works of literature. There is no escape from the search for
an ultimate connection between all disciplines of human thought. Culture, progress,
their relationships with material things are all inevitably connected, even if this
connection is its all-prevalent absence. Recent developments in quantum physics and
post-human philosophy have provided the key to the intimate substance of all things –
information. Although, the numerous branches of information structures are to be
studied separately to grasp, appreciate and use their manifestations, to truly
understand reality it is necessary to understand the nature of information itself. The
two works of literature examined here are Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818) and
Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick or, The Whale (1851). In the first part, Frankenstein
will be subdivided into homeostatic informational systems and the observer effect
will be examined with respect to each system. Then the information theory will be
applied to the character of Ahab in an examination that will focus on the nature of a
willful observer and how it operates in the realm of literature.
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I. Introduction
In his 1958 book Physics and Philosophy, Werner Heisenberg establishes a
fundamental locus of truth – a substance observed. By claiming that “the transition from
the ‘probable’ to the ‘actual’ takes place during observation,” Heisenberg provides the
observer with a power over all reality (Heisenberg 23). The repercussions are
monumental. Since observation “selects of all possible events, the actual one that has
taken place,” the observer documents and measures actual reality and, as a result, allows
it to exist (Heisenberg 23). The observer is so powerful, that by only the act of watching,
he is understood to alter the very instance of existence that is being watched. This is the
so-called observer effect, first proposed by Heisenberg as part of the quantum theory. The
crown jewel of modern physics, the quantum theory concerns itself with the strange
microcosm that composes the entire underlying basis of all reality. This domain is
something so fundamental that its laws can be witnessed in all comprehensible
phenomena, including works of literature.
In the following pages, I will uncover and examine the observer effect and its
parent theories of quantum mechanics and informational reality in two canonical texts of
the English language: Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818) and Herman Melville’s MobyDick or, The Whale (1851). I will trace the role of the observer in these works and
connect this subject to how it is understood in the quantum and in the information
theories. By pursuing this line of discovery, I aim to apply theories of science to literary
texts as a stubborn experiment in search for a supreme connection. I want to show that, as
Shakespeare’s Hamlet already noticed, “there are more things,” things inescapably
fundamental in the pursuit of exegeses (1.5.169). To do this, I will attempt to show that
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literary analyses of even 19th-century novels can be recontextualized to allow for an
informational examination. In this, I intend to prove that representational reality, which is
what all literature is, is not only an augmentation, or rather a mode, of actual reality, but
can also be explained, just like the non-literary reality, by using scientific theories.
It has to be proposed that when these works were created, they could only be
shaped according to already existing laws and infrastructures of language. And these laws
of language structuring could then be explained, at the very fundamental level, in terms
of informational structuring as it is approached in quantum physics. Because of this
connection, it could be shown that, at the fundamental informational dimension, defined
by the quantum, there is no divide between the real reality and the literary reality. As the
literary is some representation or expression, or a version of some external reality, the
same exact informational material is used for literary construction and same exact
frameworks are used to organize that material. So the literary phenomena would
necessarily manifest the same exact underlying nature of the phenomena that take place
in the real world. Since a novel, or a short story, or a poem, or a film represents
something that necessarily behaves according to scientific explanations, then the
representation itself, the events in the novel, the relationships between the characters, the
plot line developments, even syntactic word order, will also act in this way.
The representational/expressional signification of this kind does not end with the
boundaries of the literary reality. It extends into the real, as the real world leaks into the
literary. The literary does not just behave as a passive representation, but actively affects
the outside reality through informational flows, just like the real world affects the literary
back, through its observers. What this means is that works of art, i.e. these novels, while
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reproducing or signifying reality, affect non-literary reality on a physical level. From this,
it can be shown that the laws of language, the behavior of literary construction material,
are the same as the laws of information, which is known to assume physical properties at
the quantum level.
From Jacques Lacan we know that linguistic signs are the same as informational
signs; they are placeholders for meaning, arising from signifiers pointing to their
signified, and from these signifiers’ “reducing to ultimate distinctive features and of
combining according to the laws of a closed order” (Lacan 191). Informational structures
act the same way, by reduction of their stored values, by pointing to other locations, and
by changing and updating incessantly throughout these operations. They are
indistinguishable ontologically – the characters in a novel and the reader himself are both
informational systems. By taking these novels as case studies and examining them as
these systems, it can be shown that, on the quantum level, literary information behaves
universally in accordance with the philosophy of physics, just as all information behaves
in the real world.

II. Mary Shelley’s Informational Systems
In February of 1998, the observer effect was itself observed in a controlled
experiment conducted at the Weizmann Institute of Science in Rohovot, Israel. The
experiment demonstrated that a beam of electrons, sifted through a perforated barrier,
was “affected by the act of being observed,” and the beam’s electrons shifted their
behavior from the nature of waves to that of particles (Weizmann). This was not the first
time the power of the observer was recognized and contemplated. The 18th-century
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idealist philosopher George Berkeley insisted that some kind of an observer is needed for
anything to exist at all. Although speaking of all methods of perception, Berkeley wrote
that he couldn’t deduce “how the Testimony of Sense can be alledged, as a proof for the
Existence of any thing, which is not perceived by Sense” (Berkeley 22).
But even the Kantian school of idealism would not be enough to explain what the
observer actually is, considering the growing prevalence of empirical approaches in
science. More recent philosophy calls upon the observer to become an important
component of the posthuman theory. In her book How We Became Posthuman, N.
Katherine Hayles places the observer as a crucial player in the establishment of system
reflexivity, a concept, which describes how closed, homeostatic systems of information
maintain themselves through feedback loops.1 Reflexivity itself is a notion of a larger
theory of cybernetics, which Hayles attributes to the work of a mid-twentieth-century
group of scientists and theoreticians, among them Norbert Weiner, who argued that
human beings and “the social structures they devised operated as self-regulating
mechanisms” constituted of information (Hayles 7). The cybernetic theory of reality
further offered “a fully articulated epistemology that sees the world as a set of
informationally closed systems,” a revelation based on the work of Humberto Maturana
and Francisco Varela (Hayles 10).
Hayles writes that although it would seem that in these type of procedural
interactions “information [flows] from the system to the observer… the feedback can also
loop through the observers, drawing them in to become part of the system being
observed” (9). The resulting conceptualization “shifts from the cybernetics of the
observed system to the cybernetics of the observer” (Hayles 11). A system then becomes
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dependent on “mutually constitutive interactions between the components of the system,”
including the observer, regardless of that system’s informational content (Hayles 11). As
applied to human behavior, the observer could be considered a powerful character in the
informational systems of human beings and their social structures, both commonplace
subjects of literary representation.
It can be shown that literary works can be considered in terms of Hayles’s
systems of informational content, composed of characters, plot lines, dialogue, all
interacting with each other in accordance with theoretical conceptualization that has a
basis in physical reality. More specifically, a set of characters can be understood as a
closed homeostatic system and their relationship, as it develops in the narrative, as a
process of that system. Another character could be established as an observer and then
behave according to the quantum theory and Hayles’s conceptualizations, by feedback
loops, outside measurements, and informational exchanges.
In the case of Frankenstein, because of its epistolary mode, the entire novel can
be seen as a structure built on multiple levels of observation. The very top observer in the
system of the novel is, of course, the reader, the ultimate critical portal through which the
novel’s system is connected to the outside. But the immediate observer within the
ontological, literary system of the book is Margaret Saville. In the language of atomic
physics, she is, what Heisenberg calls, the main “measuring device” that must be
separated from the phenomenon that “we are going to study” (Heisenberg 25).
Margaret appears to be the ultimate observer of both Victor’s story and more
importantly, of Robert Walton’s. Margaret’s effect on Walton seems to be his heightened
concerns for carefulness and caution, or at least his conscious effort to convey this
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concern in his letters. The March 28th letter painstakingly informs Margaret that Walton
will “do nothing rashly” and that she knows him “sufficiently to confide in [his] prudence
and considerateness whenever the safety of others is committed to [his] care,” the others
here being his ship crew (Shelley 11-12). Then the July 7th letter assures Margaret that
Walton “will not rashly encounter danger” and will be” cool, persevering, and prudent”
(Shelley 13).
Here it can be comprehended that Walton’s actions are affected in some way by
either his sister’s actual concern for his safety, or his own perception of what she may be
expecting of him. Her perceived watchfulness therefore, while she does not even have a
single line of dialogue in the story, weighs immensely on Walton’s mental state and
consequently, his actions. Laura Claridge points to Walton’s confessing his failure as a
poet to Margaret and proposes a parent-child relationship between the two characters.2
Claridge ascribes Walton’s zeal to succeed at his expedition to a “compulsion on
Walton’s part to prove himself” to the maternal Margaret (16). The observer in Margaret
becomes an even stronger influence once Claridge’s ideas are taken into consideration.
This is how the observer affects the system, by an underlying psychology of the text
itself. The changes in the system can be seen in the interactions between the characters,
their informational exchanges and manipulations.
Trapped in the Arctic ice, Walton writes of his imminent death and through his
sister laments his own fate – “Oh! my beloved sister, the sickening failings of your heartfelt expectations are, in prospect, more terrible to me than my own death” (Shelley 153).
Here Shelley establishes Margaret as a vantage point from which Walton’s own attitudes
and motivation stem forth. Margaret’s supposed desire of Walton’s safe return, another
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maternal aspect, which is never actually expressed by her explicitly, is the measuring
device of Walton’s behavior. For some reason, he imagines that this is what she must
want – Claridge’s hypotheses again come into forefront, as the mother imago ravages
through Walton’s psyche. Although Margaret is only present in Walton’s mind, this
concern is enough to alter his decisions and to upset the system of his venture.
When his crew makes him promise to turn back once a passage through the ice
becomes available, Walton tells his sister that he “in justice, or even in possibility” could
not “refuse this demand” (Shelley 154). While at the same time, here and in other letters,
he indicates that he had not “conceived the idea of returning,” and that he had “rather die
than return shamefully,” unable to achieve his discoveries (Shelley 154-155). So Walton
seems resolute to continue his quest, even until his death. Yet he turns back for England.
Something disturbs and stops him, something that he considers worse than death.
According to his letter, it is his sister’s influence. Walton emphasizes that she expects
him to return safely and also to uphold proper ethics towards the safety of his crew. Here
Margaret can be understood as an observing presence, which measures, and at the same
time influences, the outcome of Walton’s entire voyage, the process, which is subjected
to, what Heisenberg calls, her “method of questioning” (Heisenberg 26).
The closed system of the ship, with Walton as the driving force of its function, is
constantly being watched and measured by Margaret. The system and the observer
therefore become one and the same. Margaret is in Walton’s head and so is one with the
system. As Walton’s decisions and his entire enterprise feed back through Margaret into
the final outcome, reaching a homeostasis, which involves his decision to return in
disgrace.
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Margaret’s influence is so great that even the impassioned speech by Victor
during the mutiny, urging the crew to go on with their expedition albeit certain death, to
“be more than men,” could not readjust Walton’s motives (Shelley 155). Here Walton
could’ve taken the chance to pick up Victor’s torch and fan the flames of his crew’s
courage, or perhaps even straight-out ordered them to go on. But instead, he simply asks
the men to “consider” what Victor has told them (Shelley 155). Because, Walton
explains, he “cannot lead” his men “unwillingly to danger,” the collective justice and
moderation of Margaret’s watchfulness surely are at play in his mind (Shelley 156). It
becomes undeniable that Margaret shifts Walton’s process, and by being an established
observer affects and changes the trajectory of his adventure.
Here, the entire voyage can be seen as a Hayles homeostatic system, and the
informational processes in it, Walton, Margaret, the crew, the ship’s course, the Arctic,
bounce against each other in certain ways. Because it is a literary representation, and
specifically a faithful one, the voyage’s informational content acts the same exact way, as
it would be constructed in the real world. That is, the underlying quantum of both the
novel’s social structure of the ship and some informational system of a real ship would be
subject to the observer and to his influence in the specific way described by Hayles and
Heisenberg. Walton’s informational state is no different from an informational state of an
actual 19th century Arctic explorer, who would also have had similar concerns about his
family, finding himself in a similar situation, and so forth.
Both systems would behave according to the same laws and are influenced by an
observer in exactly the same way. This is because there is no difference between how
language acts on a page and how reality acts on a purely informational level. People, their
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bodies, their mental states, and their social structures are arranged the same way as all of
these things are arranged for their fictional counterparts. And here, we can see clearly,
that there is no difference between an observer created in flesh and bone and an observer
created in language. They have their systems and their processes, and act within these as
attested to by Heisenberg.
Walton, of course, is himself an observer. Shelley establishes him as a sort of a
camera eye that records Victor’s story and projects it back out onto Margaret’s screen. As

a key information maker, he measures the entire endeavor against the sensibilities of his
audience by documenting it. He also becomes a participating factor in the final outcome.
He alters some crucial moments simply by recording information and feeding it back into
the fundamental system of the novel, the informational complex of Victor and his
creature. For Walton to be able to do this, Shelley provides him with the proper
eloquence and some vivid personality traits. She infuses his dialogue with very
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pronounced allusions to the visual to formulate him as a powerful watcher, literally and
subliminally.
In the first three quarters of the novel Walton is still somewhat outside Victor’s
system. We can get the approximation of Frankenstein at this point as Figure 1. The
diagram can be thought of as a snapshot, one of the moments of the overall informational
exchange during the novel. The sizes of the systems and their positions shift ceaselessly
to accommodate all changes. Victor’s system would come to dominate by the end of the

novel. But his system draws to its planned conclusion precisely because of Walton’s
presence and observations. Without Walton it would be unclear how the story would play
out.
Victor is the main driving force behind his own clockwork. “Nothing can alter my
destiny,” he tells the sympathetic Walton (Shelley 18). Victor also sets up the main
system outcome, so to speak, along with this outcome’s components and processes – “I
must pursue and destroy the being to whom I gave existence; then my lot on earth will be
fulfilled and I may die” (Shelley 153). What is then evident is how the system of
14

Victor/the creature feeds back through Walton, draws him in and then incorporates him
into its codes and processes. This can be seen when Walton is recruited into Victor’s
mission of destroying the creature. “Swear to me, Walton,” Victor urges on his deathbed,
“that he shall not escape; that you will seek him and satisfy my vengeance in his death”
(Shelley 150). Victor’s ego – the information that is Victor – absorbs Walton here, like an
amoeba consumes a paramecium. This is palpable because Walton does not put up any
protest against this request. He doesn’t even ponder it, but simply continues with his
story. Walton’s taking of the monster-killing baton is a mechanical course of events.
Thus the observer in Walton becomes one with the system he is observing, exactly as
Hayles proposes it. The overall change in the novel can be seen in Figure 2.
After he becomes part of the Victor/the creature’s informational complex, Walton
modifies it to bring it to its pre-programmed conclusion in a very specific way. In the
final scene of the novel Walton encounters the creature in Victor’s cabin. The creature
has made his way onto Walton’s ship and is now grieving over Victor’s dead body.
Walton startles the creature, and the monster goes for the window in an antisocial display
of shameful evasion. It is here Walton’s observer role takes control and fully imbeds him
into the fate of these characters.
Walton informs that in this moment he “shut his eyes involuntarily, and
endeavored to recollect what were [his] duties with regards to” the creature (Shelley 158).
It is indicated earlier that the creature’s hideousness is the factor of Walton closing his
eyes. But when read closer, Walton’s immediate state is not indicative of fear, but of
calculation. As a matter of fact, Terry Thompson notices, “Walton is the only character in
the entire novel who does not flee or tremble in horror when first confronted by the
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monster face to face” (Thompson 301). The reason for this becomes clear when
considering Walton’s role as the observer of the system.
The emphasis in the description of his reaction to the creature is on automatic,
unconscious action. Walton follows his programming, in line with Victor, who programs
him earlier with this exact situation – a chance meeting with the creature after Victor’s
death. Victor also warns Walton “in advance about the creature’s immense size and
grotesqueness,” which according to Thompson is one of the reasons Walton does not run
away (Thompson 301). Walter is mentally prepared for this encounter; there is no escape
for him, as he is informationally initiated into Victor’s system.
Walton also suspiciously does not let the creature escape without a conversation.
Should he not be sufficiently frightened to try to end this situation as quickly as possible?
Walton, as the principal character established as a system observer, has to play his part
for the system to complete itself. The construction of the entire narrative depends on his
participation. And he does it by feeding his observations back into the system. Walton
tries to shame the creature and tells him that Victor may still be alive if only the creature
felt any guilt before he exacted his “diabolical vengeance to this extremity” (Shelley
158). Here the informational currents that convey that the creature’s motivation was
vengeance come from Walton. This information is fed back into the system, along with
feelings of shame, to provoke yet another reaction from the creature. Walton’s
informational substance begins to leak back into the creature to unite the two characters.
The unity between Walton and the creature is further accentuated when the
creature mentions Henry Clerval, Victor’s childhood friend whom the creature kills in
Ireland. How does the creature here know that Walton knows who Clerval is? Is there a
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hole in the story? When approached from a purely informational analysis, this familiarity
makes sense. It is because Walton’s and the creature’s individual informational selves
have begun to share themselves with each other. This information sharing results in a
tacit comprehension on the part of the creature that Walton knows everything – “you,
who call Frankenstein your friend, seem to have knowledge of my crimes and his
misfortunes” (Shelley 160). That is, the creature exhibits a sort of an intuition that accepts
Walton as being part of the system. Furthermore, Walton is not rejected by the creature,
but is used as a confidant and a recorder. All this is done to properly complete the
informational complex of Victor and his creature, of which Walton has now become an
integral part.
The creature here is not a passive component. He understands that Walton serves
as the observer, but he pushes back and tries to influence observation and documentation,
very much like when Victor edits Walton’s writings, so as “not a mutilated” record of
Victor’s story “should go down to posterity” (Shelley 151). The creature then expounds
on his internal states to set the record straight, so to speak, and also to feed himself back
into the system. But most importantly, the creature informs of his plans of the system’s
completion, which is almost exactly the same as Victor’s – “neither your’s nor any man’s
death is needed to consummate the series of my being, and accomplish that which must
be done; but it requires my own” (Shelley 160).
All the processes are in agreement with each other and the end result is already
calculated. The observer effect tweaks it just enough to assure that it will happen, as the
observer loses himself in the system. Here, the boundaries between Victor, Walton and
the creature are blurred even further, which is evident by Walton’s continuous verbal
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abuse. “Wretch! It is well that you come here to whine over the desolation you have
made,” he says to the creature and goes on for more admonishments (Shelley 159). This
language is incredibly close to an earlier scene, in which Victor talks to the creature for
the very first time – “Wretched devil, you reproach me with your creation” (Shelley 68).
In both instances, the delivery is of anger and hateful irony and the speaker intends to
induce feelings of shame in his target. Both are examples of psychological abuse and
emotional manipulation. It’s as if Victor himself is speaking to the creature while
possessing Walton’s body. He truly does “hover near” (Shelley 150).
Walton’s verbal tirade leads to even more feedback and finally to the ultimate
conclusion, in which the creature reveals his plans to immolate himself at the North Pole.
Although Walton cannot continue his process of polar exploration, the overall system
completes it for him. The system of the entire narrative is also completed thusly. Without
Walton’s interference as the observer and without his informational feedback, the reader
would never know how each process comes to completion. Walton, in turn, completes the
creature’s and also Victor’s processes, by directly engaging the creature and so,
informing the reader of the creature’s imminent destruction. Thus Walton acts as an
ingenious tool of narrative structuring. He acquires information, which is measured
against some conventions of morality, his “superior heart,” as Thompson calls it, and the
maternal influences of Margaret Saville (Thompson 301). Walton then turns that
information back into the system and changes this system enough for it to arrive at its
preprogrammed outcome.
Walton’s observational influences in the novel are, in a certain sense,
constructive. He allows for the completion of goals. The observer effect’s truly disruptive
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properties are most palpable in the epicenter of the novel. They are most evident in
Victor’s experiments. In the instance when Victor engages in “the horrors of… secret
toil,” he begins a new process (Shelley 33). When he tells Walton of the conditions
during the process of creation, Victor depicts himself as completely alone. Victor lives
and works in a “solitary chamber… at the top of the house and separated from all other
apartments by a gallery and staircase,” and he even stops all contact with his family
(Shelley 34). According to Lester Friedman and Allison Kavey, Victor works against
desirable conventions of contemporary science. They point out that he “pursues his
scientific investigations outside the rules governing acceptable scientific knowledge
production” without academic sponsorship and peer review (Friedman 26). Victor’s
methodology is of archaic Renaissance alchemy and is socially illicit by the early
nineteenth-century conventions. What this means is that there is no observer to measure
and influence Victor’s progress within some communal scientific ethics. And so the
tragic consequences unfold precisely as the result of his unobserved and uncalibrated
process.
Although a gruesome crime against nature that results in horrible tragedy, can it
be denied that the first creature is a technical success? In an incredible achievement,
Victor does create life. The creature is a testament to Victor’s talent and perseverance as
a scientist. In terms of methodology, this astonishing outcome, if it is to be replicated,
becomes dependent on certain rules of antecedent. Let’s establish the primary rule for this
success – the work has to be done in secret, outside any scientific community, and
without anyone watching over the creator. We know that when Victor is forced by the
creature to build a second creature, he tries to recreate this precise condition. He travels
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to “some remote part of Scotland” to work on the second creature in “solitude,” and then
works “ungazed at and unmolested” in a solitary cottage by the sea (Shelley 117). Thus,
solitude and secrecy, the preconditions established by the first experiment, are also
attempted to be met here. Victor’s talent and technical ability didn’t change. But the
second creature is a technical failure. Although this failure is the result of Victor’s
deliberate self-sabotage, not of any lack of skill, the fact remains that the finished
experiment results in a non-working creature. We can see that the system, almost
identical to the first experiment, does not come to the same conclusion.
The one factor that distinguishes the second experiment from the first is that there
is now an observer. This observer is the first creature. The first creature follows Victor to
Scotland to make sure Victor keeps his promise to create the creature’s mate. “Depart to
your home and commence your labors,” the creature commands, “I shall watch their
progress” (Shelley 104). Here, the first creature is fully established as the observer of
Victor’s second experiment. As the observer, the first creature has a profound effect on
this system, so much that it completes itself in a totally different way from the first one.
Heisenberg describes a crucial characteristic of the observer - his “incomplete
knowledge of the system” (90). The observer affects the system because each
measurement reintroduces “the element of incomplete knowledge” into it (Heisenberg
91). With this unknown element ever present, or actually, interpolated by the observer, a
certain amount of uncertainty and subjectivity is always at play. The blueprint of Victor’s
first experiment – its clandestine loneliness – is disrupted by uncertainty. The difference
between the two experiments is emphasized in Victor’s recollections – “during my first
experiment, a kind of enthusiastic frenzy had blinded me to the horror of my
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employment; my mind was intently fixed on the [result] of my labor, and my eyes were
shut to the horror of my proceedings” (Shelley 118). Interestingly, the language here
establishes him as being blind through the course of his work. Victor is established as
only a process of the system, and he is only concerned with completing his process. The
lack of his visual prowess in this instance underscores a certain lack of connection to the
greater scheme of things, so to speak, to the outside of his system. What’s more, there is
no Heisenberg’s uncertainty in Victor; he is consumed by his work. Victor is not
measured by any outside instrument that could shake him with doubt, or some ethical
conundrum.
In the second attempt, however, the first creature, by the act of watching, connects
and opens Victor’s experiment to the outside. The observer effect manifests itself as a
series of specific plot developments. Victor is now aware that he is being watched. “I did
not doubt but that the monster followed me, and would discover himself to me should I
have finished,” he tells Walton (Shelley 117). There is a certain psychological
interference and a change in Victor’s mental state, which Shelley reveals in descriptions
of mood and behavior. Now the experiment is engulfed in a cloud of perpetual fear, the
effect of Heisenberg’s incomplete knowledge. Victor tells Walton, “every moment I
feared to meet my persecutor” (Shelley 118). Here, the observer recalibrates the system
psychologically by interjecting a new emotion, a new subjective element, a degree of
uncertainty.
The immediate cause of Victor’s fear is unclear. It appears that Victor only fears
to meet the creature again and especially not knowing when this will happen. The
ambiguity of Victor’s fear leads to a hypothesis that this fear is not wholly his, but also

21

the creature’s. The creature establishes the primary mode of his observation – “an
unutterable anxiety” (Shelley 104). This anxiety stems directly from the creature and
infects the entire system. Furthermore, the creature wrests all agency from Victor. The
loss of agency is alluded to by Victor’s state of mental disarray and helplessness against
his own fate, and specifically, by Victor’s loss of visual power. He reports that during his
off hours, he “sat with his eyes fixed on the ground, fearing to raise them lest they should
encounter the object, which [he] so much dreaded to behold” (Shelley 118). The creature
takes control of the system by watching it, as Victor loses his ability to watch. This
powerlessness provokes a reaction from Victor to establish a homeostatic equilibrium,
which results in the destruction of the second creature and experimental failure.
Because the first creature commissions the second creature to fulfill a sexual
purpose, it can be supposed that Victor’s and the creature’s anxiety as that of a sexual
nature. Because this is now the predominant mode of the system, Victor’s attempted
alleviation of this fear also takes on the anxieties of sexuality and reproduction. As Anne
Mellor elaborates, Victor “has rationalized his decision to murder the female creature,”
because of his “desire to control and… destroy female sexuality” (“Possessing Nature,”
361). Here, if Mellor is correct, Victor’s violence manifests from his unconscious
unprocessed biological drives and desires for sexual agency. Most importantly, these
discomforts introduce a large measure of subjectivity into the process of Victor’s work.
To achieve a homeostasis, the uncertainty of his sexual anxiety is rationalized by
Victor’s newly found collective conscience. Suddenly, he becomes aware of the wider
consequences of his work. “A train of reflection occurred to me to consider the effects of
what I was now doing,” he recollects his meditations, “had I a right, for my own benefit,
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to inflict this curse upon everlasting generations” (Shelley 118-119). The creature, by
observing Victor’s work, connects Victor’s clandestine system of medieval science to the
outside, the novel at large. But through an informational exchange, the information of the
novel reaches even further, to the outside of the actual novel, and into the socio-cultural
informational structures of what Friedman and Kavey call “ethical boundaries” of
legitimate and desirable scientific approaches (Friedman 15).

III. The Bit or, The Whale
It was demonstrated that it is possible for a work of literature to be understood as
a series of informationally defined systems, connected to each other and to the outside
through reflexivity and feedback loops. The theoretical thread that led up to this idea is
articulated by N. Katherine Hayles, who applies this concept to social consciousness.
Hayles also stresses the role of the observer, a figure of monumental importance in
quantum physics.3 In conjunction with Hayles’s discourse, Werner Heisenberg asserts
that a subatomic system, subject to the laws of quantum mechanics, “is in fact a part of a
much bigger system, eventually the whole world… of which the observer is a part” (121122). He also informs that a probability of an event in this system “changes
discontinuously when the observer takes cognizance of a result of measurement” (92). It
is then, to be understood that the observer affects outcomes of processes through
measurement and more specifically, through the conscious realization of the act of
measuring. Moreover, it can also be established that the observer can willfully alter
probability of an event such that the result is something that the observer wants to occur.
That is, the observer, by the act of watching, however long it may take or whatever
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methodology is utilized, can theoretically bring an event to a desired conclusion.
Considering literature, this concept of the willful observer, someone who consciously and
deliberately tries to alter the system towards a desired goal, is epitomized in Melville’s
Ahab.
Just like Shelley’s Europe, Melville’s oceanic and maritime spaces can be
understood as homeostatic systems, governed by specific laws and subject to
measurements and observation. The ocean in Moby-Dick is established as such a
phenomenon at the very start of the novel. Its definition is delineated through an
underlying dichotomy of water and land. The ocean is fleshed out with respect to New
York City, which, in addition to being the pivotal starting point of the book as a futile
triumph of rationality, activates the major themes of watching and observation. The entire
“insular city of Manhattoes” is designed so that “right and left, the streets take you
waterward,” where the reader is invited to “look at the crowds of water-gazers” (Melville
4).
Here, the ocean is identified as something to be looked at; and so it takes on all
aspects of an observable informational system. Hence, everything that happens in the
ocean – weather phenomena, movement of water, actions of a whaling ship, and
mereologically, actions of singular sailors can be understood as individual processes. The
metaphysics are doubled as Ishmael implores the reader to look at the lookers. Through
all of these actions, the oceanic system amalgamates the observer (and his consequential
observers, i.e. the readers of the novel) into itself by osmosis, where he becomes a part of
the system and subject to its nature and processes. In turn, he also affects it by looking,
and thereby himself becomes affected and changed.
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Melville treats the city as specifically engineered to not only facilitate but also
compel observation. The streets act as behavioral conduits that direct the collective gaze
unto the water. The city emerges as a place of looking out, a control booth beside the
cleanroom of a laboratory where researchers look through the glass at the hydrogen
atoms smashing into each other, or a two way mirror in an interrogation room. In this
same sense, Melville’s water watchers stare at the sea waves as physicists look at a
supercollider in order to learn the behavior of the elements, or as detectives to find some
clue in a suspect’s body language. The sea gazing of the forlorn New Yorkers, who are
longing for some control over the monstrous oceanic expanses of their own selves, are
then transposed to the whalers of the Pequod to act upon the greater maritime system of
the novel.
In the passages of the chapter “The Mast-Head” Melville outlines observation as a
vital component in the informational process of a whale-ship. Albeit the magnificent
poetry, descriptions carry resemblances to an instruction manual. We are informed that
the mast-heads are manned at the same instance the vessel leaves the port, long before the
ship would reach the usual hunting grounds. And if there’s any empty oil container left
on the ship, the “mast-heads are kept manned to the last; and not till her skysail-poles sail
in among the spires of the port, does she altogether relinquish the hope of capturing one
whale more” (Melville 167). The ship’s watch is incessant throughout the journey, even
regardless of any possibility of encountering a whale; the watching is done as part of
technical protocol.
Thus it is established that watching is an operational necessity in whaling.
Melville attests to the power of this practice when he places mast-standing outside
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whaling. “The Egyptians were a nation of mast-head standers… an assertion based upon
the general belief among archæologists, that the first pyramids were founded for
astronomical purposes,” he muses of the activity (Melville 165). Here the
pseudoscientific claim is no doubt quipped facetiously, to anoint the fringe and outcast
whalers with the grand dignity of antiquity. At the same time, the scientific allusions
attest to Melville’s and the whalers’ comprehension of observation as a routine scientific
procedure. Both archeology and astronomy are mentioned, two disciplines driven almost
entirely by the act of looking. Even some methodology is described, as the astronomers
are said to “mount to the apex [of the pyramid], and sing out for new stars; even as the
look-outs of a modern ship sing out for a sail, or a whale just bearing in sight” (Melville
168). The emphasis is on empirical evidence and a trust in the senses to deliver a
measured, rational result. Thus, like the intimated scientific practices, watching the ocean
becomes an effort to rationalize the irrational. It is a vital technique, used to uncover and
grasp nature and its laws, and to control and gain their powers. The whale is the particle
inside the subatomic accelerator. He is to be captured, not in theory, but in actuality, by
empirical science and a calculating harpoon.
In the informational system of the novel, incessant, methodical observation is no
doubt used as a means to summon Moby-Dick into an encounter. The crew of the Pequod
use watching to affect the informational flow of the novel’s homeostasis. The incessant
observation transforms the ship into a wandering eye. Pequod consumes all information
in its path and then absorbs and processes reality through the will of its occupants. It is an
unconscious effort, but based in an innate understanding that the act of looking has a
profound power. Constant watching unites the collective identity of the ship into a
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coherent, functional unit. It also relieves various anxieties as perpetual vigilance
transforms into a sense of safety, which also enables continuous functionality.
In the informational exchange between the observing Pequod and its system
certain conditions arise to influence other processes, i.e. whales and industry competitors.
Only through active observation the relationships between the processes can be
established. This administration of visual input enables willful rearrangement of
information. Ultimately, it works, and Moby-Dick is found. This impossible event is akin
to a scientific discovery. An informational imprint has been programmed into the system
again and again, and so the novel’s reality is rearranged just enough for the climactic
meeting to take place. The entire composition of the novel follows the law of the
observer, by which the literary reality of Moby-Dick is rendered.
Melville’s watchful whalers reach the existential meta-heights of literary
representation. Their methodical process shifts the novel’s fictional information, mirrored
in the real world subatomic principles. How would watching for a whale, in created
fiction and in physical reality, both of which are actually physical and indistinguishable
phenomena as far as the quantum is concerned, make a whale appear? Quantum physics
proposed that the rearrangement of information by the act of watching impacts physical
reality, because reality itself is information. In his 1996 paper The Physical Nature of
Information, Rolf Landauer states that “information is inevitably tied to a physical
representation” (Landauer). Because of this connection, information is necessarily subject
to “restrictions and possibilities related to the laws of physics and the parts available in
the universe” (Landauer). While conducting research for IBM in 1961, Landauer
proposed that the act of deleting information from the physical, isolated system of a
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digital memory drive releases energy and behaves according to the laws of
thermodynamics. What became known as the Landauer Principle, these ideas are now
widely accepted by the scientific community and point to the theoretically and
experimentally demonstrated conclusion that information is a physical thing.
Landauer’s work was based on an already existing idea of the information theory,
developed by Claude Elwood Shannon, a mathematician and engineer, who in the 1940s
designed communication systems at MIT and later at Bell Labs. Shannon, revered in the
engineering circles as the ‘father of the digital age,’ connected circuit design and
mathematics and defined the binary unit of information, the bit.4 He formulated the
information theory during World War II, while working on encryption.
Shannon’s information theory, when looked at from the quantum mechanical
point of view, asserts that everything about a quantum particle, its properties and
behavior, can be expressed as binary information. The universe then can be seen as a
system of subatomic particles and all reality as the result of the multitudinous processes
within this system. The information theory, although untestable and highly controversial,
gained strong proponents, such as John Archibald Wheeler, the legendary physicist, who
worked on the Manhattan Project and collaborated with Albert Einstein on the unified
theory of physics. In his famous and fantastically wild essay “Information, Physics,
Quantum: The Search for Links,” presented at the 1989 Quantum Mechanics Symposium
in Tokyo, Wheeler asserts that “every physical quantity, every it, derives its ultimate
significance from bits, binary yes-or-no indications” (109).
One of Wheeler’s remarkable claims places the observer into the very innerworkings of creation. “No element in the description of physics,” he writes, “shows itself
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as closer to the primordial than the… device-intermediated act of posing a yes-no
physical question and eliciting an answer or, in brief, the elementary act of observerparticipancy” (Wheeler 109). The observer is a primal force. “How come ‘one world’ out
of many observer-participants?” asks Wheeler as one of his hypothesis (Wheeler 110). To
answer this fundamental question, Wheeler proposes an unconditional finite state of all
available information (i.e. the universe is a finite thing) and advocates for the dispelling
of the illusion of the space-time continuum. For Wheeler, the observer carries the
essential role of bringing reality… into reality.
The idea is that all physical things exist as encoded binary information, which, to
be reified, has to be processed according to whether the underlying bits are on or off, etc.,
just like in standard operations of a digital computer. This information has to be observed
and actively interacted with, to bring forth, what Wheeler calls, the “participatory
universe,” in which the observer has to determine the states of the underlying bits (111).
In an extraordinary thought-experiment, Wheeler furthers the work of Stephen Hawking,
who proposed that the outer edge of a black hole is the measurement of its entropy, or
energy loss. But since entropy is also the measurement of the loss of information, which
is the process that, according to the Landauer Principle, acts accordingly to the laws of
physics, the black hole itself can be revealed to the observer as “information lost,”
through the ability of quantum elements to present “physics as information” (Wheeler
112).
While proposing information as the underlying fabric of reality, Wheeler opposes
the conceptualization of the universe as some sort of a machine. The laws of physics did
not exist before the Big Bang, so there were no architects or blueprints, or pre-engineered
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schematics and clockworks. The convenient mythology of the composed and existing
physical objects is just that – mythology that displaces and qualifies an absolute truth.
Rather, Wheeler states, the world is “self-synthesized,” as “the notes struck out on a
piano by the observer-participants of all places and all times, bits though they are, in and
by themselves constitute the great wide world of space and time and things” (113).
Wheeler defines an observer-participant as someone who “operates an observing
device and participates in the making of meaning” (112). He assigns this agent, in his
actions of observation and measurement, a crucial significance. “No elementary quantum
phenomenon is a phenomenon” until it’s observed and registered, he writes, and all of
“reality is a theory,” he quotes Torgny Segerstedt (Wheeler 112) And so from Wheeler,
we get a picture of everything as, what Douglas Adams calls, a “Whole Sort of General
Mish Mash” of active looking, questioning, more looking, answering, looking again,
more questions, more answers, and so on (Adams 655). All existence becomes a
contemplative quest for knowledge and realization, all of it, just an opportunity at
meaning creation, to be discovered and communicated through the “primordial entity” of
the informational bit (Wheeler 112).
The recorded discussion after Wheeler’s presentation of his work touches on the
subject of the observer. “Did you mean to say that the observer influences the observed
object?” asks the not-as-poetic Nico van Kampen (Wheeler 113). “The observer does not
influence the past,” replies Wheeler, “instead by his choice of question, he decides about
what feature of the object he shall have the right to make a clear statement” (Wheeler
113). The observer chooses the questions, and looks to get his answers, and so, constructs
reality. There’s only one thing he has to decide – which questions to ask.

30

Ahab has clearly chosen his questions, or rather, the one and only question. “Hast
seen the White Whale?” he bellows at the passing ships (Melville 476). He observes the
processes of his universe and processes them in exactly the same way Wheeler describes
– by questions that can only be resolved in a binary answer, either a yes, or a no.
According to Inger Dalsgaard, Ahab “represents a certain, misdirected scientific mindset” that resembles Victor (249). Dalsgaard asserts that, like Victor, Ahab is a practitioner
of illicit science. Tasked by investors with acquiring product for profit and consumption,
Ahab tosses this job aside and “sins against a capitalist contract, as much as against
nature, God, or family life” (Dalsgaard 251). What Dalsgaard suggests allows Ahab to
fully concentrate his will on informational rearrangement. Dalsgaard stops short of
assigning Ahab with his informational role, but it can be clearly seen from this analysis.
As a willful-observer participant, when you try to change the very fabric of reality you
cannot sin against God. You are God. You also cannot be distracted by trivial nonsense,
like some insipid social contracts or fairy tales. Considering these ideas, a scientific mind
emerges as a kind of a struggle between social collective pressures and the individual
will.
Wholesale observational interference is not easy and not just anyone can be
successful at it. This can be seen in the novel’s fictional simulacrum. Willing Moby-Dick
into an appearance takes a lot of energy and certain personality traits, such as Ahab’s
characteristic obsessive morbid genius. Not only the observer has to spend energy
watching and measuring, he also has to keep himself coherent enough as not to get utterly
absorbed by the informational system he is operating upon. These are the stakes for
someone who wants to rearrange reality. Keeping a functional, sovereign self is a crucial
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predicament for a researcher. This is why Ahab’s temperament can be seen in some
stereotypical quirks and manias prevalent in historical scientists. His archetypal
eccentricity is reminiscent of Nikola Tesla, who “regularly worked from 10:30 in the
morning until 5:00 the following morning” and calculated the cubic contents of his meals
before eating, or Alexander Graham Bell, who “in the throes of a new idea… pleaded
with his wife to be free of family obligations,” and then worked “for up to twenty-two
hours straight without sleep (Currey 137, 175). What can be seen at play in the scientific
temperament of Ahab is rabid individualism.
There’s also Ahab’s mechanical, machine-like quality, also noticed by Dalsgaard,
who brings up hints of the railroad in Ahab’s language.5 Ishmael describes the pivot
holes, strategically drilled into the ship’s deck, and into which Ahab inserts his prosthetic
leg to keep himself steady. Once his prosthesis is connected into the ship, Ahab stands
“erect, looking straight out beyond the ship’s ever-pitching prow” (Melville 135). By this
invention, Ahab becomes one with the ship, his primary instrument of agency and his
immediate informational super-process. Ahab and the ship combine to form a sort of a
mechanical apparatus, designed for observation and research based in that observation.
The essence of this man/machine contraption is concentrated in Ahab’s gaze. “There was
an infinity of firmest fortitude, a determinate, unsurrenderable willfulness, in the fixed
and fearless, forward dedication of that glance,” Ishmael described his first impressions
of the captain (Melville 135). From this, it becomes clear that Ahab is the primary
observer of the novel. All is governed by the actions of his watchfulness. He is the
supreme eye that materializes Moby-Dick into the novel’s narrative.
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Ahab becomes absorbed into his observation. The act of watching overtakes his
identity and he almost loses himself. He watches the sea for “hours and hours… gazing
dead to windward, while an occasional squall of sleet and snow would all but congeal his
very eyelashes together” (Melville 256). He is so integrated that he becomes unaffected
by environmental conditions. An image of a biologist late night at a microscope comes to
mind, looking and looking. Although being a “living instrument” himself, Ahab, as a
good scientist, does not rely on chance alone, but consults data and uses tools (Melville
201). He “intently” studies charts and adjusts them according to his calculations,
methodically, “with a slow but steady pencil,” adding “courses over spaces that before
were blank” (Melville 215). While doing his research, he “would refer to piles of old logbooks” that list times and places “in which, on various former voyages of various ships,
sperm whales had been captured or seen” (Melville 215). Ahab is a diligent data analyst –
“almost every night [the charts] were brought out; almost every night some pencil marks
were effaced, and others were substituted” (Melville 215). Although below the deck,
Ahab still observes the system of the ocean. The ocean is abstracted into charts and
whaling data to facilitate its informational processing.
The reader learns that even Ahab’s maps, informational significations of MobyDick’s oceanic system, integrate its mad researcher. As Ahab studies the sea charts, the
lamp in his cabin, rocked by the motion of the ship, casts “lines upon his wrinkled brow,”
so that “while he himself was marking out lines and courses on the… charts, some
invisible pencil was also tracing lines and courses upon the deeply marked chart of his
forehead” (Melville 215). The themes of absorption and integration of an agent by a
larger unknown structure are returned to over and over in the novel. It is clear that,
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somehow, Melville comprehends these phenomena, but perhaps has no scientific
language to reify them. So he simulates them and displays them through deep poetics, in
the minute details of intense literary imagery. The subatomic is paralleled and at the same
time extended metaphorically. Melville doesn’t use mathematical formulas, but the
theoretical concepts he argues for are illustrated in his characters. Ahab is the x and his
whale is the y. What is the mass and energy needed for them to collide? Which
electromagnetic and gravitational forces are produced in the oceanic currents? The novel
expresses and calculates the same fateful laws as how an algebraic formula calculates a
trajectory of a quark.
As discussed above, Ahab’s fevered solipsism and apathy for any competing
ideology, his diligent scientific methodology, and his physical-mechanical nature,
establish him as the novel’s main observer-participant. When compared with Ahab’s
monstrous will, Ishmael appears as an incidental observer, without much energy to
change any course of events, except maybe his own little process. As a matter of fact,
most of the whale-watchers available on the Pequod are not very reliable. “I kept a sorry
guard,” Ishmael confesses rather nonchalantly (Melville 171). “In the serene weather of
the tropics,” the reader is informed, “it is exceedingly pleasant – the mast-head; nay, to a
dreamy meditative man it is delightful” (Melville 169). It is safe to assume that on top of
a mast-head there is barely any participation taking place, and what seems like even less
observation – “There you stand… lost in the infinite series of the sea… the tranced ship
indolently rolls… everything resolves you into languor” (Melville 169).
What actually happens on the mast is best described by Jennifer Baker, who
writes that such “empirical investigation produces a pleasurable stimulation of
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imagination” to actually undermine strict empiricism and to favor subjective idealism
(Baker 93). As Heisenberg shows, a certain degree of subjectivity from the observer
affects the system outcome. The problem is that this subjectivity of idealism does not
allow for an independent system needed for the existing informational content. It already
assumes that the system depends wholly on the observer’s perception. This necessarily
produces total uncertainty, something that is uncontrollable and something that can only
be existed in, not affected, because there is nothing to affect, except the observer himself.
This state of material absence can be witnessed in Ishmael’s melancholy sea-gazing.
Unfortunately, or perhaps fortunately for Ahab, the entire whaling industry is
experiencing a scarceness of competent observers. The type of observer available is
proposed very sonorously in Ishmael’s address to the ship-owners – “nowadays, the
whale-fishery furnishes an asylum for many romantic, melancholy, and absent-minded
young men… seeking sentiment in tar and blubber” (Melville 172). The whale industry
attracts philosophers, not empiricists. Most of the Pequod’s hires do not care about
catching whales; their interests lie with contemplation of the mysteries and existential
theorizing “over Descartian vortices,” for which the sea provides them with the proper
psychological state (Melville 173). What happens, with respect to Wheeler, is that the
observer in this case cannot make any impact. It’s clearly seen that the observer is not a
participant, because he is only observing internally; he is only concerned with his own
individual informational process. So in adjusting the system’s overall information for the
purpose of an encounter with Moby-Dick, the rest of the Pequod crew is pretty much
useless.
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And so, Ahab absorbs the entire ship. “As the unsettling polar star, which… six
months’ night sustains its piercing… central gaze; so Ahab’s purpose now fixedly
gleamed down upon the constant midnight of the gloomy crew… It domineered above
them… Like machines, they dumbly moved about the deck, ever conscious that the old
man’s despot eye was on them” (Melville 582). Although Victor also shows a powerful
charisma, here his path with Ahab swerves. Unlike Victor, who gains a semblance of a
social awareness, Ahab never achieves a higher consciousness. He remains in himself.
And also unlike Victor, Ahab gains total command over his ship’s crew and their wills.6
This is why he exemplifies an observer-participant par excellence. Ahab becomes the
sole observer-participant on the Pequod – “his whole life was now become one watch on
deck” (Melville 584). And so, his intense participation in the overall system famously
pays off – “Fate reserved the doubloon for me. I only; none of ye could have raised the
White Whale first. There she blows!” (Melville 595). The whale is finally discovered,
through measurement, proper observational tools, and Wheeler’s informational binary
switching. The process was repeated over and over until the fateful desired result of the
novel’s ironically successful, disastrous quest.

IV. Conclusion
It is unfortunate that information, as it’s used in the contemporary sense, projects
impressions of what Jean-François Lyotard calls “Mephistophelian functionalism,” an
object to be manipulated and commoditized (Lyotard 416). What’s worse, it has
connotations of something purely utilitarian, something to be consumed, discarded, or
stored in an electronic device, a technological pedestrian banality. It also raises problems
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in its dialectic with knowledge. I share Donna Haraway’s lament that in such approaches
to literature “the certainty of what counts as nature – a source of insight and promise of
innocence – is undermined, probably fatally” (Haraway 294). But as Haraway also points
out, “the alternative is not cynicism, or faithlessness, or abstract existence,” but a
connection and a blending of boundaries of the highest order (294). Because John
Wheeler’s information is neither utilitarian nor banal, in any sense. It is rather that which
Spinoza saw as a “substance prior to its modifications… something of which the
conception requires not the conception of anything else” (Propositions). It is the sublime
material that composes a crystalline structure, a poem, and a DNA molecule, the stuff
that puts it all in a formation.
N. Katherine Hayles approaches it in a similar understanding, as a sort of an æther
that human social constructions arrange themselves with, something that ebbs and flows
and coalesces into material things, even human bodies, an animating, shaping force, a
sense which is closer to its original meaning.7 I believe information as a concept can
transcend its gross inhumanity and become accepted as a vital cultural keyword. And I
truly believe that an informational understanding can enrich aesthetic sensibilities. While
I understand that some connotations of prosaic artificiality may never be fully
relinquished, this conceptualization can provide a structuralist analytical alternative, and
even democratize consciousness.
We saw that the observer of a closed informational system, as it is understood in
physics, behaves exactly the same in literature. He measures and affects creative choices
through the limits and pressures of characterization and plot-devices, and adjusts
probabilities of events according to his desires, motivations, and even according to the
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absence of these things. In their very essence, the texts themselves exist in a purely
informational way, that is, they are systems that are, at the fundamental quantum level,
collections of switches that point either this way, or that, thereby creating and governing
their own processes. On the higher planes they tell stories, convey and evoke emotions,
thoughts, images, process personal and collective anxieties, open connections, document
and express human conditions. But at the very bottom of all creation, they are avatars of
supreme communication and of the underlying mode of all things. They also change from
being observed, from edition to edition and from one reader to the next. Once the
information of a book is observed, the informational system of reader/book is forever
changed, because the informational process of the reader is changed from the act of
reading.
The laws of nature are immutable, even though a lot of them have not been
discovered. “Does the Sun fail to exist, because we have seen nothing like it?” asks
Montaigne (Montaigne 330). The stars follow certain laws and so does the human
imagination. The creative forces that ignite all genius operate by the tools and materials
available. They acted the same way since the inception of representative consciousness,
and they act the same now – through informational alchemy. It is not a mistake to
conjecture that because these books were created without the knowledge of the laws that
governed their creation does not mean that those laws do not govern them. All things are
composed in very specific ways. What makes literature exempt from full theoretical
treatment? A literary work is only as complex as the mind that produced it, and according
to Joseph Conrad, “the mind is capable of everything – because everything is in it, all the
past as well as all the future” (Conrad, II).
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The quantum theory’s connective faculties were not lost on Heisenberg. For him
it was the key to the great secrets not only of primordial particles of reality, but also of
human nature. He understood, as did all of the physicists of the golden age of physics,
that there was a divine thread that united everything, and that this thread was not a myth,
but a reality. Things could be learned from it, things far more reaching than any ideology.
Science now could be, as mythology, a source of “the old wisdom,” the one that reminds,
“when searching for harmony in life one must never forget that in the drama of existence
we are ourselves both players and spectators” (Heisenberg 26). And where is this drama
best represented than in literature? As the laws of the quantum theory become revealed in
a short story, or a poem, or a novel, the principle laws that govern nature are also
revealed to govern its human-created reflections. From this revelation we can see that
there is no separation between reality in literature and reality outside of it. Rather the
representative/expressive realities are only modes of tangible reality. The information
between these modes is shared in a fundamental, underlying informational structure,
which functions according to the laws of quantum mechanics. By taking on these laws,
these reflective modes themselves become part of nature, part of its vast informational
field, in which little informational processes reflect and in turn, give birth to their reality,
so they themselves could be observed and brought into existence.
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Notes
1

Hayles, N. Katherine. How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics,
Literature, and Informatics. University of Chicago Press, 1999, p.8.

2

Claridge, Laura P. “Parent-Child Tensions in Frankenstein: The Search for
Communion,” Studies in the Novel, vol. 17, no.1, North Texas State University,
1985, p. 16. JSTOR: www.jstor.org/stable/29532322. Accessed 19 Mar. 2020. It
can be understood that the older sibling Margaret Saville had raised Robert
Walton, since nothing of their mother is mentioned in any of his letters, while an
uncle is mentioned as the sole caregiver.

3

Hayles, N. Katherine. How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics,
Literature, and Informatics. University of Chicago Press, 1999, p.9. This is where
the observer is acknowledged as being part of the overall system by the means of
a feedback loop.

4

Markowsky, George. “Claude Shannon.” Encyclopædia Britannica,
www.britannica.com/biography/Claude-Shannon. Accessed 22 Mar 2020.

5

Dalsgaard, Inger Hunnerup. “‘The Leyden Jar’ and ‘The Iron Way’ Conjoined: MobyDick, the Classical and the Modern Schism of Science and Technology,” edited
by Sanford E. Marovitz and A. C. Christodoulou, Melville ‘Among the Nations’:
Proceedings of an International Conference, Voios, Greece, July 2-6, 1997, Kent
State UP, 2001, p. 245.

6

Shelley, Mary. Frankenstein, edited by J. Paul Hunter, Norton, 2012, p. 155. In another
remarkable similarity with Ahab, Victor tries to rally Walton’s crew after they
mutiny, but fails to persuade them to continue with the dangerous and selfish
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voyage. It is hinted that perhaps if Victor was in a better shape the sailors may
have obeyed him.
7

“inform.” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary. Merriam-Webster, 1985, p. 620.
Partial entry: from Latin “(14c) 1. obs. to give material form to 2. b : to be the
characteristic quality of: ANIMATE <the compassion that informs his work>”
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